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Papers
Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness
Author(s): Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori, Alessandra Sgobbi
Summary:
Discusses the classical theory of negotiation (bilateral, single issue, complete information) Rubinstein alternating offer game. The paper then goes on to discuss multi-player, multi-issue particularly sequential bidding with bargaining agendas, bargaining in stochastic environment and repeated bargaining. Also goes into coalition forming and “fairness” (however not very relevent for discount factors).
Multi-issue Negotiation with Deadlines
Author(s): Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas Jennings
Summary:
Give a brief description of the bilaterla negotiation looking at time constraints (deadline as well as discount factors) Discusses different procedures e.g. package deal (which is my focus), simaltaneous, sequential. In section 3 it discusses the equilibrium in the different procedures and presents theroem s with proofs. In section 4 it discusses a little bit about uncertainty where the utility of the opponent is unknown to the agent.
IAMHAGGLER: A Negotiation Agent for Complex Environment
Author(s): Colin Williams, Valentin Robu, Enrico Gerding, Nicholas Jennings
Summary:
This paper gives a brief description of the strategy and methods the IAMHAGGLER uses. It uses the discount factor to calculate an estimated utility of the opponent. With the use of the discount factor (and other formulas) IAMHAGGLER is able to predict the maximum possible discounted utility at a given time t and si able to determine what sort bid the agent should offer at any given time t. IAMHAGGLER makes a distinction between ordered and unordered issues. With unordered issues it uses baysean learning (choosing an iso-utility space, which is the same as a threshold range for the bids).
Benefits of Learning in Negotiation
Author(s): Dajun Zeng, Katia Sycara
Summary:
Looks at the idea of learning with in a sequential decision making protocol. They created a protocol called BAZAAR. Lays focus also on the learning of reservation value and how that can be benefitial by creating a better bid exchange (less bids exchanged before agreement is made) and a better joint utility.
The Impact of Time Pressure Negotiation: A Meta-Analysis
Author(s): Alice Stuhlmacher, Treena Gillepie, Matthew Champange
Summary:
This Paper combines the results of various studies in the domain of negotiation and time pressure, looking at the effect that time pressure has on the negotiation process. Specifically the outcome (the speed of), agent strategy. It also briefly presents potential moderators of pressure effects. They used different methods to moderate or simulate time pressure (e.g. deadlines, incentives, etc). They choose different experiments classifying them based on criteria like, type of conflict, they type of pressure, etc. Also they provide an evaluation of the different mediators and how they effect the negotiation process.
A Negotiation Model of Incomplete Information Under Time Constraints
Author(s): Cao Da-Jun, Xu Liang-Xian
Summary: This paper presents a bargaining model based on the more general model for negotiation of alternating offers. They present what the equilibrium combination for the bargaining model is. The tested their model through experimental evaluation.
Approximate and Online Multi Issue Negotiation
Author(s): Shahee Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas Jennings
Bargining with Deadlines
Author(s): Rumas Sandholm, Nir Vulkan
Bargaining with incomplete information
Author(s):Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas Jennings
Effect if Revealing final deadline on Negotiation Outcomes
Authors:
Multi Issue Negotiation under time constraints
Author(s): Shaheen Fatima, michael wooldridge, Nicholas Jennings
On Efficient Procedures for Multi-issue Negotiation
Author(s): Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas Jennings
Optimal Negotiation Strategies for agents with Incomplete Information
Author(s): Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas Jennings
The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence
Author(s): Alvin Roth, Kieth Murnighan, Francoise Schoumaker
Impact of Time Pressure and Information on Negotiation Process and Decisions
Author(s): Alice Stuhlmacher, Matthew Champagne
Summary: This paper describes an experiment where they manipulated the time pressure as well as the information about the agents. They made certain hypothesis about the effects of the time pressure and information and tested these. They created a negotiation scenario where a participant negotiates with an agent, about a job at a restaurant. The looked at the target agreement the participant specified before the negotiation process, the first offer made. Whether the strategies changed, concession rate, inconstant offers (where the offer has a higher utility than the previous offer).
The Unexpected Benefits of Final Deadlines in Negotiation
Author(s): Din Moore
Effects of Time Pressure and accountabiliyu to constituents on Negotiation
Author(s): Igor Mosterd, Christel Rutte
Testing The Negative Effect of Time Pressure in Retail Supply Chain Relationship
Author(s): Rodney Thomas, Terry Esper, Theodore Stank
Time Pressure in Acquisition Negotiation: Its determinants and effect on parites negotiation behavior
Author(s): Marmen Saorin-Iborra
Ultimatum Deadlines
Author(s): Wenjie Tang, Niel Bearden, Ilia Tsetlin
Negotiations with Incomplete Information Under Time Pressure
Author(s): Door Martin Schilling
Time Pressure and closing of the mind in Negotiation
Author(s): Carsten De Dreu